[In percent]

	His	Hers	Total
Yes	31.7	31.2	31.4
No	59.4	57.8	53.6
No opinion	8.9	11.0	10.0

9. Do you believe we should work to establish new diplomatic relations with Cuba?

[In percent]

	His	Hers	Total
Yes	45.5	40.8	42.7
No	43.9	44.1	44.0
No opinion	10.6	15.1	13.3

10. Do you feel we should adopt a long-range volunteer program to change over to the metric system of weights and measures?

[In percent]

	His	Hers	Total
Yes	42.2	35.0	38.5
No	44.2	48.8	46.5
No opinion	13.6	16.2	15.0

11. Do you believe that the Congress should pass some type of national health insurance legislation which would subsidize the premiums for the poor and offer all citizens protection against catastrophic medical expenses?

[In percent]

	His	Hers	Total
Yes	63.9	64.9	64.4
No	26.2	25.9	26.1
No opinion	9.9	9.2	9.5

NEWS RELEASE

HON. DAVID W. DENNIS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 14, 1974

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, I have released to the press a statement regarding the current push for the President's resignation which I should like to call to the attention of my colleagues, as well as to the general public. My statement follows:

MAY 13, 1974.

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Rep. David W. Dennis (R-Ind.) said today that he does not favor the resignation of President Nixon, but instead, feels that "the constitutional processes should take their course."

"The hearings of the Judiciary Committee have just begun, and of course I have not made up my mind about impeachment," Congressman Dennis said.

"I am, however," he continued, "opposed to the President's resignation. I think the constitutional processes should take their course."

"Resignation would inevitably be considered a confession of guilt, and, in my view, is not possible for a President who asserts his innocence," Rep. Dennis stated.

"Moreover, I doubt that it has become appropriate for party leaders to urge resignation. Currently there is much public clamor and discussion, but certainly anyone in public life who urges resignation should first seriously ask himself the question—to what extent am I moved by moral indignation, and to what extent by concern for my own political survival?" the Hoosier Congressman said.

AN ADDRESS BY CIA DIRECTOR, WILLIAM E. COLBY

HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 14, 1974

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, few Americans would dispute that an effective central intelligence agency is vital to the security of the United States.

Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that there continues to be some unease in the land about the conduct of intelligence gathering, its underlying philosophy, and its possible abuses. A strong measure of reassurance is needed.

The top men in our intelligence services rarely "go public." When they do, their remarks deserve our close attention.

Accordingly, I am pleased to place in the RECORD the recent address of William E. Colby, Director of the CIA. Of particular interest is Mr. Colby's description of how technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in the years since the U–2.

Entitled "Foreign Intelligence for America," the address was delivered on May 3, 1974, at the well-known forum, the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

The address follows:

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICA

(By William E. Colby)

Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in America. One of our earliest national heroes, Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our first President, General Washington, was an assiduous director and user of intelligence. Intelligence has changed in recent years, however, and today its reality is different from its traditional meaning. In the common understanding, intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying. But what I would like to talk about tonight is the way we in America have changed the scope of the word "intelligence," so that it has come to mean something different from that old-fashioned perception. These changes have stemmed from characteristics peculiar to America and from the nature of our society.

The first and most dramatic change in today's meaning of the word "intelligence" stems from the technological genius of Americans. We have applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and of our scientists. In the short space of eighteen years since the U–2 began its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence. In 1960 this country engaged in a great debate as to whether there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Today the facts are so well established that such a debate is impossible. Then we had to try to deduce from bits of circumstantial evidence how many missiles the Soviets had; today we see and count them. We wondered then what new missiles the Soviets might be developing; today we follow their tests and determine from them the range, the size and the effectiveness of such missiles.

This technical contribution to intelligence not only provides a better basis for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Over the years such limitation treaties were always stopped by one essential feature: the United States needed some assurance that the other party would abide by a treaty's restraints. Thus we came up with [illegible] skies" proposal and tried to negotiate o site inspection procedures. The Soviet lea ers rejected these because they believed su measures would permit foreigners an und degree of access to their sovereign territo

It was only after American intelligen developed the ability to monitor such agre ments from afar, through technical mea that we on our side became sufficiently co fident to begin the process of mutual ar limitation. In the text of the first SA agreement, intelligence in fact was ev admitted to polite diplomatic society unc the name of "national technical means verification."

Technology has revolutionized the telligence business in many other ways yond those I just described. They provi a precision to our knowledge of the wo around us, which was inconceivable fift years ago. I might add that I give credit to the many talents here in Califor which have contributed immensely to t effort.

The second major contribution Amer has made to intelligence stemmed in p from a bad American habit. This was habit of disbanding our intelligence m chinery at the end of every war, requiri us to reassemble one hastily at the beg ning of a new war. Thus we abandon intelligence in the period after World W I, when Secretary of State Stimson is leged to have commented that "gentlem do not read each other's mail." We disband the Office of Strategic Services in Octo 1945, only to establish a new central telligence apparatus to help meet the C War in 1947.

This habitual exercise provided somethi new in 1942. We were faced then with urgent need to provide intelligence supp to our governmental and military lead ship about such disparate areas of the wo as the North African littoral, the "hum between China and India, and distant P cific islands. General William Donovan, first director of central intelligence, m bilized the talents of academia and indus to assemble every possible American sou of information on these subjects.

This central pool of intellectual tal proved its worth and provided the base the second major American contribution the intelligence profession. While certai the collection of information is vital to telligence, an equally vital contributi comes from the analysis, assessment a estimating process. The analytic staff wit the Central Intelligence Agency has acc to all the raw information on foreign ar available to our Government, ranging fr that which is completely public to the m secret products of our worldwide collecti apparatus. It subjects this information the intellectual talents and experience its membership, which in scope and schol ship can rival those of our large universiti It then produces objective and reasoned sessments of developments around the wo and projections of likely future trends.

Some of the work of this corps of expe has come to light through the revelation the Pentagon Papers, in which the vari national estimates on Vietnam were sho to have been independent, objective ass ments of the likely future course of ev there. This is not the time or place to deb American involvement in Vietnam and many factors which influenced it; I ment these reports only to demonstrate what t assessment process can contribute: an ind pendent and objective assessment of a f eign situation, unaffected by political co mitments or departmental parochialism.

As has been reported in the press, I ha made certain changes in the bureaucra structure through which these assessmen are produced, but the estimating process its essential remains as it was. I hope I ha reinforced it by my own insistence th